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“To try and find out the reason for everything is very dangerous and leads to 
nothing but disappointment and dissatisfaction.”
—Queen Victoria
The world, according to Spinoza, is an intelligible place. This conviction is 
reflected in his philosophy in numerous ways. He believes that the order of being 
and the order of reason mirror each other, as is evident in the way he defines his 
basic ontological categories both in terms of what inheres in what and what is 
conceived through what. Moreover, for him, every event is causally determined 
in accordance with natural laws that are always and everywhere the same. These 
laws follow from the eternal and infinite essence of God in the same way that the 
geometrical properties of a triangle follow from its nature. Thus, laws of nature 
are intelligible in the same way as the objects of geometry are intelligible, and all 
events conform to this rational order. Spinoza’s confidence in the rationality of 
the world is also reflected in his Principle of Sufficient Reason, which says that 
if something exists, there is a cause or reason why it exists, and if it doesn’t exist, 
there is an explanation of its nonexistence.
Not only does the world have an intelligible structure, but human reason 
is capable of discovering that structure. We have, in virtue of being modes of 
God, an adequate idea of the infinite and eternal divine essence that allows us to 
infer from it the laws of nature as well as the formal essences of singular things. 
Indeed, reason in the human mind is no different, for Spinoza, than reason in the 
divine intellect, and our ideas, insofar as they are rational, are indistinguishable 
from God’s own. Reason, for Spinoza, is not only intellectually but morally 
important as well. Our highest good involves using reason to understand God or 
nature, ourselves, and our place in nature, which results in enduring happiness. 
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Moreover, for him, the more rational we become the more powerful we are with 
respect to mastering ourselves and our environment and the more harmoniously 
we can live with our fellow human beings. Accordingly, many commentators 
have seen Spinoza’s philosophy as a celebration of reason: its ability to penetrate 
the metaphysical structure of the world, to reveal the natural order, to bring 
happiness to the human mind and health to the human body.
We could call this conviction in the rational order of existence Spinoza’s 
rationalism. This rationalism, in my view, is a heterogeneous phenomenon. It 
is a diverse collection of independent doctrines, each one of which expresses a 
general optimism about reason but none of which are entailed by this optimism. 
Some commentators, however, have sought to understand Spinoza’s rationalism 
as a more systematic position that can be traced back to a single principle. For 
example, Michael Della Rocca writes:
Spinoza can be seen as a pure philosopher, always seeking explanation, always 
refusing to be satisfied with primitive, inexplicable notions. This purity is most 
evident in his commitment to the principle that each fact has an explanation, 
that for each thing that exists there is an explanation that suffices for one to see 
why that thing exists. […] [T]his principle is known as the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason (PSR). […] Spinoza employs the PSR more systematically, perhaps, than 
has ever been done in the history of philosophy.1
To be sure, Spinoza is a pure philosopher who seeks explanations and rejects 
mysteries and irrational superstition. I have no quarrel with understanding 
Spinoza in this way. And there can also be no doubt that Spinoza accepts a 
version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Nevertheless, I will argue here 
that recent commentators such as Della Rocca (and myself in earlier work) 
have misunderstood Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason and its role in his 
system. Spinoza does not regard it as demanding an explanation of every fact 
but only of facts regarding existence and nonexistence. And, with the exception 
of the necessary existence of God, Spinoza does not derive any other important 
doctrines in the Ethics by applying the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Moreover, I 
will consider a number of cases in which commentators have argued that Spinoza 
could have derived or perhaps did in fact derive, albeit implicitly, doctrines by 
applying the Principle of Sufficient Reason. I will argue that, in each of these 
cases, Spinoza did not and indeed could not derive them from his version of that 
principle. In many cases, I will take Della Rocca’s interpretation of Spinoza as 
my target. Della Rocca has done more than any other commentator to work out 
the implications of interpreting the Principle of Sufficient Reason as the engine 
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behind Spinoza’s philosophy. Because of the great ingenuity, philosophical 
acumen, and wit with which Della Rocca develops his interpretation, I think it is 
very well worthwhile to engage with it in detail, even if, in the end, I think that 
it is deeply mistaken.
I. Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason
In the course of arguing for the necessary existence of God in E1p11d2, Spinoza 
claims that there is a cause or reason for the existence of everything that exists 
as well as a cause or reason for the nonexistence of everything that does not 
exist. Although Spinoza himself doesn’t use the term, I think that we can fairly 
call this a Principle of Sufficient Reason. It demands a sufficient reason for a 
broad topic-neutral domain: facts about existence and nonexistence (existential 
facts hereafter). And Spinoza believes that we can learn an important truth by 
applying it: that God necessarily exists. These two features alone justify calling it 
a Principle of Sufficient Reason. But we should take care not to confuse Spinoza’s 
Principle of Sufficient Reason with similar principles held by other philosophers. 
In particular, we should take care not to confuse Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient 
Reason with that of Leibniz, the philosopher who introduces the term into 
philosophical discussion and who is perhaps most associated with it. For 
Leibniz, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is not restricted to existential facts. 
Rather every truth, every fact, and every event has a sufficient cause or reason.2 
What is more, Leibniz boldly declares that it is one of two great principles of all 
our reasoning, the other being the Principle of Contradiction, and he attempts 
to solve a wide variety of philosophical problems by deploying it. Spinoza, on 
the other hand, tucks his Principle of Sufficient Reason away in an alternative 
demonstration to E1p11, using it only once, to prove the necessary existence of 
God, never to mention it again. This in itself does not establish that it does not 
play an important but implicit role in his thinking, but it does shift the burden 
of proof onto those who wish to argue that it is at work throughout Spinoza’s 
philosophy. Suffice it to say for now that Spinoza presents his Principle of 
Sufficient Reason very differently and much more modestly than, for example, 
Leibniz does. Later we will consider more closely the possibility that it plays a 
greater role behind the scenes.
First, however, we must clarify what Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason 
says. What is its scope? What is a cause or reason? It might appear that the 
principle applies to substances and modes because those are the things the 
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existence of which requires explanation. But this cannot be right because the 
principle applies to the non-existence of substances and modes as well. In the 
case of nonexistence, there are no substances or modes to receive a cause or 
reason. What then has a cause or reason in cases of nonexistence? Presumably, 
it is the fact that the substance or mode does exist. And this account smoothly 
extends to the case of existence as well. If a substance or mode exists, then there 
is a cause or reason for the fact of its existence. (Beware. There is no reason, at 
least at this point, to reify these facts. If you like, think of causes or because as 
sentential operators and not two-place predicates.)
Some commentators have alleged that Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason 
is unusually strong because it applies not just to facts about existence but also to 
facts about nonexistence.3 This is misleading. Leibniz, for example, thinks that 
all facts require a cause or reason.4 This entails that facts about nonexistence 
require a cause or reason. Therefore, Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason is 
stronger than Spinoza’s because while Leibniz’s entails Spinoza’s, the converse 
does not hold. Moreover, there are many facts that do not pertain to existence 
or nonexistence, and Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason requires these facts 
to have a cause or reason but Spinoza’s does not. Furthermore, every universal 
generalization being logically equivalent to a negative existential (i.e., that all 
ravens are black is logically equivalent to the claim that there does not exist a 
nonblack raven), any Principle of Sufficient Reason that applies to universal 
generalizations ipso facto applies to negative existentials as well. Thus, Spinoza’s 
Principle of Sufficient Reason could only be stronger than a Principle of 
Sufficient Reason that did not apply to universal generalizations, which would 
be a very weak Principle of Sufficient Reason indeed.
Many recent commentators have thought that, contrary to what I have just 
said, Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason extends not just to facts about 
existence and nonexistence but to all facts.5 Indeed, although I now reject it, I 
myself have previously defended such an interpretation. Although this appears 
to outrun Spinoza’s text by a wide margin, there is an apparently cogent argument 
to the effect that if the Principle of Sufficient Reason applies to all existential 
facts, then it applies to all facts without restriction.6 The argument for this flawed 
conclusion proceeds as follows. Modes are substances insofar as they satisfy 
some condition. Any condition satisfied by a substance grounds the existence of 
some mode. The existence of a mode requires a cause or reason. Thus, for facts 
about a substance’s existence (i.e., for facts about a substance satisfying some 
condition) there is a cause or reason. But every fact entails the existence of a 
mode. This is because for any fact we can abstract a condition from it by means 
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of the being such device. The claim that mastodons are bigger than dodo birds 
does not appear to be a claim about the existence or nonexistence of things. 
(It is not, for example, equivalent to the statement that there does not exist a 
mastodon that is not bigger than a dodo. Even if there were a dwarf-mastodon 
that was smaller than a dodo or if mastodon-fetuses were smaller than full-
grown dodos, it would still be true that mastodons are bigger than dodos.) But 
nonetheless we can abstract a condition from it that is satisfied by God: being 
such that mastodons are bigger than dodo birds. Because every condition that 
God satisfies determines a mode to exist, this fact is determined by something 
that requires a cause or reason. The fact that mastodons are bigger than dodos 
is nothing over and above the mode that exists in virtue of God being such that 
mastodons are bigger than dodos. For this reason, if the existence of every mode 
requires a cause or reason then every fact requires a cause or reason.
This argument rests on the false assumption that every condition satisfied 
by a substance determines the existence of a mode. Every condition cannot 
be a modemaker. This is because conditions are cheap and abundant and so 
do not obey the strictures placed on modes by Spinoza. For example, if every 
condition were a modemaker, then there would be modes that splayed across 
multiple attributes in an unacceptable way. For example, being such that a body 
exists and a mind exists is a condition satisfied by God. But if this condition 
were a modemaker, then there is a mode that is not fully conceivable under 
a single attribute. Every mode can be fully conceived under a single attribute 
and thus this condition cannot be a modemaker. There must be, therefore, a 
distinguished class of conditions that are modemakers. For example, it would be 
plausible to assume that, for Spinoza, the modemaking conditions are natural, 
attribute-bound, and non-relational. There must be other conditions as well. 
For example, God satisfies the condition is infinite but there is presumably no 
mode that is God insofar as he is infinite. If there were, would it be a mode of 
extension, a mode of thought, or a mode of some other attribute? None of these 
answers seem acceptable. But neither would it be acceptable to answer that it is 
a mode but not a mode of any attribute. Thus, the condition is infinite cannot 
be a modemaker. Spinoza is not explicit about how the modemaking conditions 
are restricted. I suspect, however, that the modemaking conditions for finite 
modes under the attribute of extension are those that result in the existence 
of bodies, and the modemaking conditions under the attribute of thought 
result in the existence of ideas that represent those bodies. The modemaking 
conditions for infinite modes will be those that result in the laws of nature and 
“the whole of nature” that has all finite modes as parts discussed in Lemma 7 of 
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the Short Physical Digression following E2p13s. There are many truths that do 
not determine the existence of bodies, the ideas that represent them, the laws 
that govern them and those ideas, and the whole that those bodies and ideas 
compose. Thus, there are many truths that are not within the scope of Spinoza’s 
Principle of Sufficient Reason.
Before looking at alleged uses of Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, let 
us first consider a useful distinction made by Leibniz between different ways 
that a class of truths can relate to it.7 First of all, the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
can apply to a certain class of truths. These are the truths that instantiate the 
principle. Leibniz, for example, holds that the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
applies to every truth, and Spinoza thinks that it applies to existential truths. 
These are the truths that have a sufficient reason. Second, the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason can ground a class of truths. For example, for Leibniz, all 
contingent truths are grounded by the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the sense 
that they are true because the Principle of Sufficient Reason is true.8 Although, 
for him, necessary truths have a sufficient reason, they are not grounded by it. 
Thus, the class of truths that are grounded by the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
is, for Leibniz, a subset of the class of truths to which it applies. Spinoza never 
explicitly tells us that any truth is true in virtue of the truth of the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. The one truth to which he explicitly applies it, the existence 
of God, is a case of a truth that does not depend upon the truth of the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason. God, Spinoza tells us, is self-caused. That is to say, he 
exists entirely in virtue of his nature or essence. Assuming that the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason is not part of God’s nature, his existence does not depend on it. 
Third, there are truths that can be learned by applying the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason.9 Leibniz, for example, thought that we could prove the existence of God, 
the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, the relationality of space, and the 
nonexistence of atoms by applying the Principle of Sufficient Reason. (It is worth 
noting that some of the truths that we can learn from the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason, according to Leibniz, do not depend upon it. For example, the necessary 
existence of God can be learned by applying the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
but it is a necessary truth and hence, for Leibniz, it depends not on the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason but on the Principle of Contradiction.) Spinoza only ever 
explicitly tries to derive the necessary existence of God from the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason but some commentators, most notably Della Rocca, have 
argued that Spinoza arrives at many other elements of his system by applying 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason, albeit “off-stage” as it were. We will consider 
some of those claims in this chapter with an eye toward determining the extent 
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to which the Principle of Sufficient Reason plays role in Spinoza’s system beyond 
what is manifest in his official demonstrations.
I think it’s fair to say that of the three relations that the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason can bear to a class of truths—applying to, grounding, and allowing us to 
discover—the latter two are, in many respects, more interesting and important 
than the first. So long as a philosopher admits that anything has an explanation, 
she will accept that the Principle of Sufficient Reason applies to some truths so 
long as that principle is understood in a suitably restricted way. Thus, merely 
thinking that everything (suitably restricted) has an explanation is not enough 
to make a philosopher an adherent of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in 
any interesting sense. The more permissive or topic-neutral the restriction, 
however, the more such a principle looks like something deserving to be called 
a Principle of Sufficient Reason. But such a principle becomes even more 
philosophically significant if it can be used as an instrument of discovery or 
if it grounds certain truths. As we have seen, Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient 
Reason is restricted in a topic-neutral way. It applies to existential truths. In 
what follows, we will look to see what philosophical doctrines can be learned 
by applying it and if Spinoza thinks that any philosophically interesting truths 
are grounded by it.
II. Necessitarianism
Philosophers have often thought that commitment to the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason leads to necessitarianism, the doctrine that every truth is necessarily 
true,10 and most commentators believe that Spinoza is both committed to the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason and a necessitarian.11 Is he motived to be one by 
his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason?
It is worth noting that Spinoza’s explicit statement of necessitarianism is more 
restricted than is usually supposed. For example, it is often alleged that Spinoza 
believes that every truth is necessary.12 In fact, the only things that E1p29 says 
are necessary are the existence of modes and their actions. E1p33 also states that 
the order and connection of things is necessary. Thus, it appears that, in those 
texts, he commits himself only to the necessity of the following classes of truths: 
(1) existential truths; (2) causal truths; and (3) what we might call “structural 
truths,” that is, truths about the order and connection of things. To be sure, 
Spinoza may believe or have reason to believe that other truths are necessary 
as well but those truths are not the subject of E1p29 and E1p33, and we cannot 
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assume without argument that his conclusions there generalize further. I cannot 
pursue this issue further here and will leave it as an open question.
Why does Spinoza believe that existential, causal, and structural truths 
are necessary and does the Principle of Sufficient Reason play any role in his 
thinking? Let us look more closely at E1p29 and its demonstration, which read:
In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been determined from the 
necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way. [E1p29]
Whatever is, is in God (by E1p15); but God cannot be called a contingent 
thing. For (by E1p11) he exists necessarily, not contingently. Next, the modes of 
the divine nature have also followed from it necessarily and not contingently (by 
E1p16)—either insofar as the divine nature is considered absolutely (by E1p21) 
or insofar as it is considered to be determined to act in a certain way (by E1p28). 
Further, God is the cause of these modes not only insofar as they simply exist 
(by E1p24c), but also (by E1p26) insofar as they are considered to be determined 
to produce an effect. For if they have not been determined by God, then (by 
E1p26) it is impossible, not contingent, that they should determine themselves. 
Conversely (by E1p27) if they have been determined by God, it is not contingent, 
but impossible, that they should render themselves undetermined. So all things 
have been determined from the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, 
but to exist in a certain way, and to produce effects in a certain way. There is 
nothing contingent, q.e.d. [E1p29d]
This argument for necessitarianism with respect to existential and causal 
truths (ECN) can be summarized as follows:
(1) Everything is either God or a mode of God. (E1p15)
(2) The existence of God is necessary. (E1p11)
(3) The existence of the modes is necessitated by the existence of God. (E1p16)
(4) Whatever follows from something necessary is itself necessary. (suppressed 
premise)
(5) The existence of the modes is necessary. (From 3 and 4)
(6) Causal relations between the modes are necessitated by the existence of 
God. (E1p26)
(7) Causal relations between the modes are necessary. (From 4 and 5)
(8) No substance or mode exists contingently and no casual relation obtains 
between contingently. (From 1, 2, 5, and 7)
The Principle of Sufficient Reason is not a premise of this argument and so it 
appears that Spinoza does not arrive at his necessitarianism by means of it. Of 
course, the Principle of Sufficient Reason is a premise of Spinoza’s argument for 
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the necessary existence of God, premise (2). But the necessary existence of God 
alone does not establish that every existential and causal truth is necessary. Many 
theists coherently believe that God exists necessarily but that not everything 
else exists and acts necessarily. Thus, although it is true that the argument for 
necessitarianism with respect to existential and causal truths depends on 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason to the extent that Spinoza’s argument for the 
necessary existence of God depends upon the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 
the claim that Spinoza’s necessitarianism depends on the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason suggests a much more extensive connection than that.
Apart from their connection to the necessary existence of God, do any of the 
other premises of the argument for necessitarianism with respect to existential 
and causal truths rely on or entail the Principle of Sufficient Reason? The first 
premise, everything is either God or a mode of God, follows from the fact that 
everything is either a substance or a mode and that there is only one substance, 
namely, God. Spinoza’s argument for substance monism does not rely upon 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Rather, it depends on the assumption that 
there cannot be more than one substance with a given attribute. Although some 
commentators, including Della Rocca,13 have seen this premise as deriving from 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason via the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, 
it does not, as I will argue later in this paper. Does the claim that everything is a 
substance or a mode entail the Principle of Sufficient Reason? It might be argued 
that it does by claiming that conceiving implies explaining (CIE):
(1) A substance is conceived through itself. (E1d3)
(2) A mode is conceived through the substance in which it inheres. (E1d5)
(3) Everything is a substance or a mode. (E1p4d)
(4) Everything is conceived through something. (From 1, 2, and 3)
(5) For all x and all y, if x is conceived through y, then x is explained by y.
(6) Therefore, everything is explained by something. (From 4 and 5)
Despite first impressions, the conclusion (6) is not Spinoza’s Principle of 
Sufficient Reason nor does the Principle of Sufficient Reason entail it. This is 
because Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason requires explanations for facts 
about nonexistence, which are neither substances nor modes, and thus fall 
outside of the domain of Spinoza’s quantifiers. For this reason, the conclusion 
(6) could be true even if Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason is false.14 
Nevertheless, it does establish the positive part of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason and thus could be viewed as partial support of it. For this reason, it is 
worth asking whether or not it is a genuinely Spinozistic argument.
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The credentials of premises 1–4 above are beyond dispute, but what about 
premise 5? Della Rocca has argued that a number of texts seem to imply that if x 
is conceived through y, then x is understood through y.15 If we also assumed that 
if x is understood through y, then y explains x, we would have (5): For all x and 
all y, if x is conceived through y, then x is explained by y. The relevant texts do 
not, however, strongly support Della Rocca’s contention.
The first text called upon by Della Rocca is E1a5, which says:
Things that have nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood 
[intelligi] through one another, or the concept of the one does not involve the 
concept of the other. [E1a5]
In this text, Spinoza appears to equate understanding one thing through another 
with conceiving one thing through another. If we assume that understanding is 
the state produced by successful explanation, then we might think that Spinoza 
is equating conceiving one thing through another with explaining one thing 
through another.
But the Latin word intelligere, like the English understand, can be used to 
express meanings that have no connection to explanation. For example, it can 
mean “to grasp,” as in grasping a meaning or a concept. According to this usage, 
if I say that bachelorhood is partially understood (i.e., intelligi) through being 
unmarried, that is to say, the concept of bachelorhood involves the concept of 
being unmarried, I am not asserting any equivalence between x is conceived 
through and x is explained by. I am merely asserting that the concept of a bachelor 
involves the concept of being unmarried. Likewise, a natural interpretation of 
1a5 is that one thing can be grasped in thought by grasping something else in 
thought only if the concept of the one involves the concept of the other. Thus, 
this text does not appear to offer much evidence in favor of premise (5) of the 
claim that conceiving implies explaining.
Another piece of putative evidence for premise (5) is that Spinoza sometimes 
says that substances are conceived under an attribute, and in other texts Spinoza 
says that substances are explained by their attributes. Della Rocca alleges this 
is because being conceived by and being explained by [explicatur] are the same 
relation.16 But this inference is hasty. First of all, it would not be particularly 
surprising if substance and its attributes simply stood in more than one relation. 
Moreover, it is not clear that explicatur means is explained by in this context. 
It can also be translated as is conveyed by, is exhibited by, and is expressed by. 
I argue elsewhere that the attributes are the essence of a substance, which is 
conceived under various guises.17 But Spinoza, like many seventeenth-century 
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philosophers, isn’t always careful about distinguishing a thing from the concept 
of that thing. Consequently, he doesn’t always clearly distinguish the essence, 
which is conceived under a guise, and the guise under which it is conceived. I 
am inclined, therefore, to think that when Spinoza says that substance is both 
conceived under and exhibited by the attributes, he means that our cognitive 
grasp of substance is mediated by the guise by means of which it is presented 
to our intellect. But this does not imply that to conceive of something is to have 
an explanation of it in the sense of knowing its cause or reason. Therefore, these 
texts do not provide evidence in favor of premise (5): for all x and all y, if x is 
conceived through y, then x is explained by y.
Della Rocca also cites E2p7s, where Spinoza writes:
The formal being of the idea of the circle can be perceived [percipi] only through 
another mode of thinking, as its proximate cause, and that mode again through 
another, and so on, to infinity. [E2p7s]
Why does Spinoza say that we can “perceive” something only through a 
cause? A possible answer is that perceives means conceives and conceives means 
explains. Then Spinoza would just be saying that we can explain something only 
through a cause, which is a sensible doctrine. But that conceives means explains 
is an unnecessary hypothesis in this context. In Latin, percipere can mean to 
understand. Thus, in this text, Spinoza simply means that things are understood 
through their causes. Della Rocca points out that Spinoza sometimes uses 
percipere and concipere interchangeably (e.g., E2p38d or E2p49s). But this shows 
very little because percipere is a word with several meanings including both 
to understand and to conceive. What remains to be shown is that Spinoza is 
using it to express the same meaning in both contexts and there is no evidence 
from E2p7s or elsewhere that this is the case. I conclude that the textual basis 
for attributing to Spinoza premise (5) of the claim that conceiving implies 
explaining is slight.
Let us now consider premise (3) of the argument for necessitarianism 
with respect to existential and causal truths, which says that the modes are 
necessitated by the necessary existence of God. Does it rest upon the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason? Spinoza argues for this claim in the demonstration to 1p16 
where he attempts to show that the world is produced by God. He argues for 
this by saying that God is infinitely real and the more reality a thing has, the 
more things follow from its essence. Therefore, infinitely many things follow 
from God’s essence. What Spinoza means by these dark sayings is far from 
clear but Della Rocca thinks that Spinoza is committed to the claim that God is 
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infinitely real by his commitment to the Principle of Sufficient Reason.18 (Della 
Rocca’s statement of the argument relates somewhat loosely to the text so, in 
what follows, I have adapted his formulation to bring it closer to the letter of 
E1p16d.) Spinoza, Della Rocca notes, equates reality with power. If there were a 
possible mode that did not follow from God’s nature, then there must be, by the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason, a cause or reason for the fact that it doesn’t. There 
is no other substance that could prevent it following from God’s nature and no 
mere mode could prevent it. There is, therefore, no possible explanation for this 
lack and thus it is impossible. Della Rocca concludes that every possible mode 
follows from God’s nature, that is, God has the greatest possible degree of reality.
Della Rocca’s argument is not Spinozistic because it assumes that there must 
be a cause or reason for facts of the form substance S does not have power P. This 
is not an existential truth and so Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason does 
not require a cause or reason for it.
Indeed, it is open to doubt that any sensible Principle of Sufficient Reason 
could demand an explanation of such truths. To see this, suppose that God 
lacked the power to cause some possible mode m. If God lacked this power, then 
his essence would not necessitate m. But because God’s essence and power are 
one and the same, God lacking a power that he actually has is the same thing as 
having a different essence than he actually has. Thus, saying that if God lacked 
a power there would have to be an explanation of this lack is the same as saying 
that if God had a different essence there would have to be an explanation of 
this fact. But if it were legitimate to demand an explanation why God has the 
essence he would have if his essence were different, then it would be legitimate to 
demand an explanation of the fact that God has the essence that he actually does. 
To ask why something has the essence that it does is thus tantamount to asking 
why something is what it is. Consider the essentialist truth that gold atoms 
are gold atoms in virtue of having atomic number 79. This fact explains why 
atoms with atomic number 79 are gold atoms. But suppose someone wanted an 
explanation of this truth and asked, why are gold atoms what they are in virtue 
of having atomic number 79? There is no explanation of this fact. Having atomic 
number 79 is just what it is to be a gold atom. Similarly, there is no explanation 
of the fact that God has the powers that he does. Having such power is just what 
it is to be God.19
Let us now consider premise (6) of the argument for necessitarianism with 
respect to existential and causal truths, which says that the causal relations in 
which the modes stand follow from the divine nature. Why does Spinoza believe 
this? In causing the existence of the modes, God ipso facto realizes their essences 
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because, as previously mentioned, the realization of an essence is the satisfaction 
of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a thing.20 The 
essence of a thing determines its causal powers, which in turn determines a 
thing’s actions and its role in the natural order.21 The causal powers of a thing 
determine its actions because Spinoza defines action in terms of causation. 
Insofar as a thing produces an effect in virtue of its essence alone, it acts.22 In 
contrast, passions are changes in a mode’s state that are determined by its own 
essence under the influence of external causes.23 These external causes act on 
the modes in virtue of their essences. Thus, the behavior of one who suffers 
passions is determined by its essence and the essence of external causes.24 Note 
that both actions and passions are fully determined by the essences of things 
taken together. Jointly the actions and passions of all the modes constitute the 
order and connection of nature. Thus, in explaining the existence of the modes, 
God thereby also explains the actions of the modes and the causal order that 
they manifest. And yet, premise (6) does not follow from Spinoza’s Principle of 
Sufficient Reason. Rather it is dictated by Spinoza’s conception of causation, the 
relationship between God and his modes, and the relationship between existence 
and essence. He argues for it in E1p26 and E1p26d, where he says:
A thing which has been determined to produce an effect has necessarily been 
determined in this way by God. [E1p26]
That through which things are said to be determined to produce an effect 
must be something positive (as is known through itself). And so, God, from 
the necessity of his nature, is the efficient cause both of its essence and of its 
existence (by E1p25 and E1p16). [E1p26d]
Spinoza’s reasoning for this argument can be paraphrased thus:
(1) A mode is determined to produce an effect through something positive.
(2) The only positive things that could determine a mode to produce an effect 
are the existence and the essence of the mode.
(3) God determines both the existence and the essence of things. (E1p16 and 
E1p25)
(4) If x determines y and y determines z, then x determines z.
(5) Therefore, a mode is determined to produce an effect by God.
This argument does not have Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason as a 
premise. Does Spinoza arrive at any of them by applying the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason? It would appear not. Spinoza says premise (1) is known 
through itself. Premise (2) is a suppressed premise, the falsity of which appears 
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compatible with Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason. Premise (3) derives 
from E1p16, which we have seen does not rely on the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason and E1p25, which is a direct consequence of E1p16. The falsity of premise 
(4) also appears compatible with the truth of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
because it is coherent to think that every existential fact has an explanation but 
that explanation is not transitive. Consequently, premise (6) of the argument 
for necessitarianism with respect to existential and causal truths is neither 
learned through nor grounded by the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
We must conclude that Spinoza’s argument for necessitarianism does 
not depend on his Principle of Sufficient Reason beyond the role it plays in 
establishing premise (3), the necessary existence of God. It is worth considering, 
nevertheless, whether Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason might commit 
him to necessitarianism for other reasons. Consider the following well-known 
argument for necessitarianism from the Principle of Sufficient Reason25:
(1) There are contingent truths. (Assumption for reductio)
(2) There is a cause or reason for every truth. (The Principle of Sufficient 
Reason)
(3) p, the conjunction of every contingent truth, is contingent.
(4) There is a cause or reason for p. (From 2)
(5) The cause or reason of p is either a truth that is either contingent or 
necessary.
(6) If it is contingent, then some contingent truth explains itself.
(7) No contingent truth explains itself.
(8) If it is necessary, then p is necessary.
(9) Therefore, there are no contingent truths.
Notice that if we substitute Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, that there is 
a cause or reason for every existential truth, for (2), we will not be able to derive 
the conclusion. This is because not every contingent truth is existential (e.g., 
mastodons are bigger than dodos) and so the conjunction of every contingent 
truth is not existential. Consequently, Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason 
does not tell us whether or not p has an explanation.
III. The Identification of Existence and Conceivability
Spinoza thinks that something exists if and only if it is conceivable.26 Della Rocca 
has argued that we can understand Spinoza’s commitment to the equivalence of 
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existence and conceivability as stemming from two commitments, both of which 
derive from the Principle of Sufficient Reason.27 One is that existence cannot 
be brute and primitive and must instead be explained in terms of something 
else. Fortunately, according to Della Rocca, Spinoza can explain existence in 
terms of conceivability. The other is that existence is identical to conceivability. 
It is not clear that these two claims are consistent: if existence is identical to 
conceivability and is explained by conceivability, then existence is explained in 
terms of existence, which Della Rocca explicitly denies when he says that, for 
Spinoza, existence must be explained in terms of something else. I am not sure 
how to resolve this tension, and so I will focus on each of these claims separately, 
beginning with the claim of identity.
Della Rocca begins by noting that in E1p20, Spinoza says that the same 
attributes that explain God’s essence also explain his existence and therefore 
his essence and existence are one and the same. Della Rocca discerns in this 
inference the following principle:
● If there is no difference in the things that a and b are explained by, then a 
and b are identical.28
He thinks that this principle follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
because nonidentity would be brute if two things were different despite being 
explained by all the same things. God’s essence is given by his definition, 
which says that he is an absolutely infinite substance. Substances in turn are 
defined as things that are conceived through themselves. God’s essence, Della 
Rocca concludes, is his conceivability. Thus, God’s essence is identical to his 
conceivability. God’s essence is identical to his existence. Thus, God’s existence 
is identical to his conceivability. Next Della Rocca argues that the existence of 
modes too is identical to conceivability. If, in the case of modes, existence and 
conceivability are different, then, by the Principle of Sufficient Reason, it cannot 
be a brute fact that they are different. But their existence and conceivability 
are necessarily coextensive. Della Rocca asserts that given their necessary 
coextensiveness, nothing could explain their difference. Therefore, Spinoza is 
under pressure from the Principle of Sufficient Reason to identify them.
But the identification of existence and conceivability would make it possible 
to infer, from certain Spinozistic doctrines, claims that Spinoza would reject. For 
example, in E1d1, Spinoza says:
By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or [sive] 
that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing. [E1d1]
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If Della Rocca is correct and existence and conceivability are identical, then we 
ought to be able to paraphrase E1d1 by substituting “conceivable” for “existing”:
By cause of itself I understand that whose essence involves existence, or [sive] 
that whose nature cannot be conceived except as conceivable.
The resulting paraphrase defines self-causation as having an essence that must 
be conceived as conceivable. Thus, anything that is not self-caused must have an 
essence that can be conceived of as inconceivable. Any actually existing mode 
has an essence that is conceivable, but do any of them have essences that can be 
conceived of as inconceivable? What would it mean to conceive of a conceivable 
essence as inconceivable? To conceive of something x that is actually F being 
not-F is to conceive of x as not-F. The problem here is not the Berkeleian point 
that if F denotes being conceivable, we cannot conceive of it as unconceived 
because we are conceiving of it. The Berkeleian point is a mistake that results 
from confusing properties of the representation with represented properties. 
Rather, the problem is that finite modes are not conceived through their essence 
alone but through their essence in conjunction with the substance in which they 
inhere. And so, to conceive of the essence of a mode as inconceivable would 
be to conceive of something that is either actually self-consistent as possibly 
inconsistent or actually consistent with the divine essence as inconsistent with 
the divine essence. Both are impossible because essences are such that they are 
self-consistent or consistent with another necessarily. We are thus forced to 
conclude that every conceivable thing is self-caused. But Socrates is conceivable, 
and so Socrates must be self-caused. This consequence is unacceptable to 
Spinoza because he thinks that no finite mode is self-caused. Given this, Spinoza 
must acknowledge a distinction between conceivability and existence on pain of 
contradiction.
What about Della Rocca’s claim that the necessary coextensiveness of 
existence and conceivability puts pressure on Spinoza to identify them? Even if 
these relations were coextensive or even necessarily coextensive, I do not think 
that this would put pressure on Spinoza to conclude that they were identical. 
Della Rocca thinks that relations and properties that are necessarily coextensive 
are either the same or their difference is brute. Thus, he thinks that Spinoza must 
individuate relations and properties intensionally. But if Spinoza is a necessitarian 
(although I have only argued for a restricted necessitarianism here, I believe, 
as many commentators do, that Spinoza’s necessitarianism is unrestricted), 
intensions collapse into extensions. An extensional principle of individuation 
for properties is exceedingly coarse-grained. Consider the properties of having 
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a heart and having kidneys. These properties are coextensive because every 
creature with a heart also has kidneys and vice versa, and yet having a heart is 
manifestly not the same as having kidneys. Seeking greater fineness of grain, 
many philosophers appeal to intensional notions. An intension is a function 
from possible worlds to extension. Thus, while “having a heart” and “having 
kidneys” have the same extension, they have different intensions because there 
are possible creatures with hearts but not kidneys and vice versa. The way of 
intensions is not open to Spinoza because as a necessitarian there is only one 
possible world and so there is no difference between extension and intension. 
Unless Spinoza is stuck with such a coarse-grained conception of properties that 
he cannot tell the difference between having a heart and having kidneys, he will 
need hyperintensional notions, that is, notions that differ despite having the 
same intensions (and, a fortiori, the same extensions). Della Rocca assumes a 
difference in properties must either be explained by a difference in intension or 
be seen as brute and inexplicable, neglecting the possibility that the difference is 
explained by a difference in hyperintension.
Furthermore, the version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason that Della 
Rocca’s argument requires rules out any brute facts, including brute facts about 
the identity and nonidentity of properties. Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient 
Reason, however, does not require explanations for facts about the identity and 
nonidentity of properties, only for facts about existence and nonexistence. As 
such, it does not put any pressure on him to identify necessarily co-extensive 
properties even granting that such an explanation would be impossible.
Let us now consider Della Rocca’s claim that conceivability explains existence; 
things exist in virtue of being conceivable. I suppose that there is a sense in 
which this is true, but it also runs the risk of flattening the difference between 
what is self-caused and what is not. God’s existence is fully explained by his 
essence. Thus, in a way, his existence is explained by his conceivability. What 
is the explanation of the existence of any mode? It is partially explained by 
the fact that it is conceivable and partially explained by the fact that God has 
infinite reality and thus every conceivable thing follows from his nature. It is 
true that, for an intellect that adequately grasps all things, the nonexistence of 
any actually existing mode would be inconceivable. But it wouldn’t exist simply 
in virtue of being conceivable but rather being conceivable through a substance 
that is infinitely real. To be sure, such an absolutely real substance is the only 
conceivable substance and thus any conceivable mode is conceived through such 
a substance. Nevertheless, if someone were to ask why a given mode exists, and 
she was told it was because it was conceivable, she would not have the complete 
Spinoza in Twenty-First-Century American and French Philosophy138
explanation unless she also was told that it is conceivable through a necessary 
being that has infinite reality. To the extent that this latter information is an 
indispensable part of the explanation, the existence of the modes is not fully 
explained in terms of mere conceivability.
IV. The Identity of Indiscernibles
Some commentators have thought that Spinoza is motivated to accept his version 
of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles because he accepts the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason.29 In E1p5d, Spinoza says that “if there were two or more 
distinct substances, then they would have to be distinguished from one another 
either by a difference in their attributes or by a difference in their affections.” 
Spinoza’s reasons for believing this are unclear. He cites E1p4, which says that 
if two distinct substances are distinguished, then they are distinguished by a 
difference in attribute or mode. But that proposition makes only a conditional 
claim and does not say that distinct substances must be distinguished, which 
is required by the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. Neither does the 
demonstration of E1p4 offer any insight because it focuses exclusively on the 
question of what entities are available to distinguish different substances and 
does not address the question of whether or not different substances must be 
distinguished in the first place.30
Does Spinoza implicitly rely on more cogent reasoning to arrive at his 
Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles? It is tempting to think that the Principle 
of Sufficient Reason plays a role here because it is sometimes alleged that the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason entails the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles 
and Spinoza undoubtedly accepts a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. 
How does the Principle of Sufficient Reason entail the Principle of Identity of 
Indiscernibles? Typically, something like the following argument is invoked.31 
Call a truth an identity if it results from an object satisfying an identity predicate 
such as is identical to B or is not identical to B. Call a truth a qualitative truth 
if it results from an object satisfying a purely qualitative predicate, which is 
a predicate that is not formed using any device of direct reference such as a 
proper name or a demonstrative. There is an explanation of every truth (i.e., the 
unrestricted Principle of Sufficient Reason). Therefore, there is an explanation 
for every identity. The only thing that can explain an identity is a qualitative 
truth. If qualitative truths explain identities, then, for any objects A and B, 
if A and B satisfy all the same qualitative predicates, then they satisfy all the 
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same identity predicates. Suppose for reductio that there were two distinct yet 
indiscernible objects A and B. A and B satisfy all the same qualitative predicates 
because they are indiscernible. Thus, they satisfy all the same identity predicates. 
But this is contrary to the supposition that they are distinct. Therefore, there are 
no two distinct yet indiscernible objects.
But the version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason used in this argument is 
not Spinoza’s. To see this, suppose there were two indiscernible yet numerically 
distinct substances A and B. It is true that A is not B and B is not A. Suppose 
further that there is no explanation why A is not B. Does this scenario violate 
Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason? Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason 
only requires an explanation of the existence of A and the existence of B and 
therefore it requires an explanation of the fact that A is not B only if this fact 
is identical to an existence fact. But this cannot be because identity is not 
existence. To see this, consider the fact that we cannot replace every sentential 
clause concerning identity with a clause concerning existence salva veritate. For 
example, we consider the following true statement: If the tallest man is six feet 
tall, then the youngest man is six feet tall because the tallest man is identical to 
the youngest man. There is no sentence that concerns existence alone that can 
replace the sentential clause following the “because” salva veritate. For example, 
even supposing the original sentence is true, the following is false: If the tallest 
man is six feet tall, then the youngest man is six feet tall because the tallest man 
exists and the youngest man exists.
Indeed, it is far from clear that any version of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason entails the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles. The argument for the 
Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles from the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
considered earlier must assume that identities are grounded by qualitative 
truths. Otherwise, the nonidentity of A and B could be explained by the fact 
that, necessarily, A is not B or that it is part of A’s essence that A is not B or 
that it is a conceptual truth that A is not B. Or the A is not B in virtue of A’s 
haecceity. Thus, identities could have explanations even if the Principle of 
Identity of Indiscernibles is false. Only when we make that further assumption 
that identity truths are grounded by qualitative truths do we get the Principle of 
Identity of Indiscernibles. But this assumption is sufficient all by itself to derive 
the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles and indeed is logically equivalent to 
it.32 The Principle of Sufficient Reason is completely otiose in this argument.
Although it is a somewhat philosophically disappointing conclusion, the 
available evidence strongly suggests that Spinoza puts his Principle of Identity 
of Indiscernibles into his system by hand rather than deriving it from more 
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basic principles. There is no textual evidence to support the contention that he 
derives it from his Principle of Sufficient Reason, and there are no philosophical 
considerations that would lead us to conclude that he should or could derive it 
from that principle.
Conclusion
For Spinoza, the world is an intelligible place. The existence and nonexistence of 
everything have a cause or reason. What is more, this cause or reason is sufficient 
for it. Given the cause or reason, it either must exist or couldn’t exist. This is his 
Principle of Sufficient Reason. But there are other ways in which the world is 
intelligible as well. Everything has an essence that fully determines a complete 
set of intrinsic properties, causal powers, and actions. The interaction of the 
essences fully determines the complete set of passive affects or passions found 
throughout nature. These causal relations are subsumed under exceptionless 
laws. Moreover, these laws, essences, and intrinsic properties are knowable by us. 
The eternal and infinite essence of God is known to us in virtue of the fact that 
our natures are finite expressions of God’s essence and thus we have an adequate 
idea of it. Every idea that follows from an adequate idea is itself adequate. The 
laws of nature are infinite modes and as such follow from the absolute nature 
of God. Thus, we can have an adequate idea of them. The essences of singular 
things also follow from the absolute nature of God and we so can know them too. 
Moreover, the intrinsic properties of things which are common to everything 
falling under the same attribute are equally in the part as in the whole and thus 
we can have adequate knowledge of them as well.
I have argued that there are many facts to which Spinoza’s Principle of 
Sufficient Reason does not apply. Are these facts brute or unintelligible? For 
example, the fact that causation is distinct from conception is not within the 
scope of Spinoza’s Principle of Sufficient Reason. Is it thereby unintelligible? I 
think not. Consider the properties of being triangular and being trilateral. They 
are, I would argue, distinct and yet necessarily coextensive. What if someone 
were to ask why they were distinct? What could we say to her to explain their 
distinctness? I can imagine no more effective procedure than trying to explain 
what a side is and what an angle is and then explaining being triangular and being 
trilateral in terms of them. At bottom, however, this procedure simply aims at 
giving her the concepts triangular and trilateral. Anyone who doubts that they 
are different simply doesn’t possess the relevant concepts. (Or is biting a bullet.) 
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The distinction isn’t brute in the sense of being arbitrary or unintelligible. If it 
is correct to call it brute it is only because it is basic or fundamental. Similarly, 
consider someone who wants an explanation of why Socrates is Socrates. 
She does not wonder, for example, why the teacher of Plato is the husband of 
Xanthippe. Rather she wonders why that man (perhaps she is pointing at him 
from across the agora) is himself. What an odd question! But perhaps we could 
answer it by saying simply that everything is what it is and not another. And 
if an explanation were requested for this? I do not believe an explanation is 
possible but it nevertheless seems incorrect to say that this fact is arbitrary and 
unintelligible. It is, rather, basic and fundamental. Seeing that it must be so is a 
perquisite for thinking about anything at all. Thus, I do not think that facts such 
as the distinctness of causation, conception, and inherence or the distinction 
between the attributes are violations of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in 
the sense that they are arbitrary or unintelligible aspects of the world. Rather, 
they are not the sorts of things to which a Principle of Sufficient Reason ought 
to apply. Sometimes your spade is turned not because you’ve accidently hit an 
arbitrary or unintelligible stone but because you hit the bottom.
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